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rationale for some form of government intervention
has seldom been challenged in the increasingly
important area of social regulation – environment,
health, safety, consumer protection. The issue here is
not, strictly speaking, deregulation but rather how to
achieve certain regulatory objectives by less
burdensome methods. Thus, the replacement of
environmental standards by pollution taxes does not
do away with environmental regulation but only
introduces different, and presumably more effective,
policy instruments.
The growth of the regulatory state
The increasing importance of regulation, relative to
other policy types, is due to several causes, two of
which are especially important in the present context:
privatisation and the Europeanisation of policy-making.
To understand the relationship between privatisation
and regulation (more precisely: statutory regulation
administered by specialised agencies or commissions),
one must keep in mind that, historically, public
ownership has been the main mode of economic
regulation in Europe. State or municipal ownership
became widespread toward the end of last century with
the development of public utilities – gas, electricity,
water, public transportation, the telegraph and, later,
the telephone. These industries, or some of their parts,
are natural monopolies which all produce necessities
and were often considered to be strategically important.
Hence, it was assumed that public ownership would
give the state the power to impose a planned structure
on key sectors of the economy and at the same time
protect the public interest against powerful private
interests.
Experience was to show that public ownership and
public control cannot be assumed to be identical. The
problem of imposing effective public control over the
great nationalised enterprises proved so intractable
that the main objective for which they had ostensibly
been created – regulating strategic sectors of the
economy in the public interest – was almost forgotten.
The failure of regulation by public ownership
explains the shift to an alternative mode of control
whereby public utilities are left in private hands but
are subject to rules developed and enforced by agencies
such as the Regulatory Offices in Britain. Such bodies
are established by statute (hence the term ‘statutory
regulation’) as independent administrative authorities
– independent in the sense that they are allowed to
operate outside the line of hierarchical control by the
____________________
* Un bref résumé de cet article en français figure à la fin.
Agencies and the new mode of governance
While agencies are certainly not a new feature of
public administration in Europe, their importance has
grown so much in recent years that they can no longer
be treated as marginal additions to more traditional
administrative structures. Rather, they should be seen
as key elements of a new mode of governance that
relies less on the power of taxing and spending – the
very foundation of the Keynesian welfare state – and
more on the power of making and enforcing rules.
Typically, rules are made and enforced by expert
agencies operating at arm’s length from government.
Thus, the growing significance of the agency model is
perhaps the clearest indication of the transition from
the interventionist state of the past to the regulatory
state of the future. So important are the implications of
this transition that this paper deals primarily with
regulatory institutions rather than with operational
agencies such as the British ‘Next Step’ or the Swedish
line agencies. It can be shown, however, that the
growth of operational agencies and ‘third party’
government also raises serious regulatory issues.
The new model of governance that began to emerge
in Europe in the late 1970s includes privatisation,
liberalisation (i.e., more competition in the market
and the public sector), welfare reform, and deregulation.
Indeed, deregulation is generally considered to be one
of the distinctive features of the new model.
Paradoxically, the same period has seen an impressive
growth of regulatory policy-making both at national
and European level. The paradox, however, is more
apparent than real. What has happened, in fact, is that
traditional methods of regulation and control which
were breaking down under the pressure of powerful
technological, economic, and ideological forces have
been dismantled or radically transformed. This is
often referred to as ‘deregulation’, but the term is
misleading. There has been no dismantling of all
public regulation, no return to a laissez-faire situation
which actually never existed in Europe, but rather a
combination of deregulation and re-regulation has
been effected at a different level of governance (e.g.
European rather than national) or by different means.
Thus, privatisation of the public utilities is typically
followed by regulation of prices and conditions of
service, while the newly privatised firms lose their
previous immunity from national and European
competition law. Deregulation can also mean less
restrictive and rigid regulation. For example, the10
departments of central government.
The causal link between privatisation and statutory
regulation provides an important, but partial,
explanation of the growth of the regulatory state in
Europe. An even more important factor is the
Europeanisation of policy-making, by which is meant
the increasing interdependence of domestic and
supranational policies within the European
Community/European Union (EC/EU). Despite the
recent slowdown in the legislative activity of the
Community, the last decades have witnessed an
impressive growth of EC regulation. For example, the
French Conseil d’Etat has calculated that by 1991 the
EC was introducing more rules into the corpus of
French law than the national authorities themselves,
while only 20 to 25 per cent of all legal norms
applicable in France are issued by the national
government without any prior consultation in Brussels.
Presumably, an analogous situation prevails in all
other Member States. Thus, EC environmental
regulation today includes more than 200 pieces of
legislation, so that in many countries the corpus of
environmental law of EC origin outweighs that of
purely domestic origin.
Such a growth of European regulations could not
fail to have a significant impact on the development of
regulatory policies and institutions at national level.
Competition policy provides a clear illustration of this
impact. When the Treaty of Rome was signed, only
Germany, among the founding members, had a modern
anti-trust law and a forceful regulatory agency, the
Federal Cartel Office, to implement it. Forty years
later, all Member States have competition authorities
that are becoming increasingly powerful and jealous
of their independence.
As this example shows, the delegation of regulatory
powers to the European level has not reduced, but
actually increased, the importance of regulatory
policies and institutions at national level. This is
because, under the policy-making system created by
the Treaty of Rome, implementation of most EC rules
is the responsibility of the Member States, which often
have to create new bodies, or at least expand existing
ones, for that purpose.
In short, in order to take an active part in the
formulation of all these new rules in Brussels and then
implement them at national level, Member States have
been forced to develop regulatory capacities on an
unprecedented scale. In this way, the development of
the EC as a ‘regulatory state’ has strongly influenced
a parallel development at national level.
From centralised bureaucracy to independent
agencies
As already mentioned, one of the most obvious
institutional consequences of the shift to a regulatory
mode of policy-making is the rise of a new breed of
specialised agencies and commissions operating at
arm’s length from central government. Many traditional
policies, such as income redistribution and Keynesian
macroeconomic management, require a high level of
centralisation in policy-making and administration.
The administrative demands of rule-making are quite
different. Such demands are best met by organisations
which combine flexibility with expertise and are
capable of committing themselves to clearly defined
regulatory objectives.
Some advocates of the agency model argue as if this
model were unconditionally superior to more traditional
methods of making and implementing policy. This is
not true, of course. For example, redistributive policies,
or policies with significant redistributive implications,
should remain under the direct control of political
executives. The model of the independent expert
agency is most relevant in limited, but important,
areas such as economic and social regulation, or for
other administrative activities where expertise,
flexibility and reputation are the key to greater
effectiveness.
In such areas, independent agencies enjoy two
significant advantages: specialised knowledge and the
possibility (because of independence from partisan
political considerations) of making credible policy
commitments. Also, the executive departments of
government routinely recruit high-level experts and
can rely on extensive networks of consultants. At the
European level, the Commission is assisted by hundreds
of expert committees providing essential scientific
and technical inputs into the EC policy process.
The real comparative advantage of agencies,
however, is the combination of expertise and
commitment. Long-term policy commitment is
notoriously difficult to achieve in a democracy, which
is a form of government pro tempore. The time limit
imposed by the requirements of elections at regular
intervals is a powerful constraint on the arbitrary use
by the winners of the electoral contest of the powers
entrusted to them by the voters. However, the
segmentation of the democratic process into relatively
short time periods has serious consequences whenever
the problems faced by society require long-term
solutions. In the expectation of alternation, politicians
have few incentives to develop policies whose success,
if at all, will come after the next election. Hence, it is
difficult for political executives to credibly commit
themselves to a long-term strategy.
One solution is to delegate policy-making powers
to institutions such as independent central banks and
regulatory agencies, or even to a supranational authority
like the European Commission. Whether at national or
supra-national level, the rationale of delegation is
essentially the same: ‘[t]he delegation of regulatory
powers to some agency distinct from the government
itself is...best understood as a means whereby the
governments can commit themselves to regulatory
strategies that would not be credible in the absence of
such delegation. It is an open question in any particular
case whether the commitment is most effectively
achieved by delegation to national rather than to
supranational agencies’.11
Independence and credibility
Credibility is important to policy makers, but it is even
more important to bodies such as some of the new
European agencies or national statistical offices, whose
main task is to provide objective information or
opinions based on the best available evidence rather
than on political expediency.
In October 1993, agreement was finally reached on
the establishment and location of several agencies
dealing with social regulation: the European
Environment Agency, the Agency for the Evaluation
of Medicinal Products, the Agency for Safety and
Health at Work, the Office for Veterinary and Plant-
Health Inspection and Control, the Monitoring Centre
for Control of Drugs and Drug Addiction. These new
agencies do not possess the power of rule-making, rule
enforcement and adjudication normally granted to
American regulatory bodies, and even lack the more
limited powers enjoyed by, for instance, Britain’s
Regulatory Offices or France’s Autorités
Administratives Indépendantes.
Council Regulation No. 1210/90 of 7 May 1990, for
example, specifies the tasks of the European
Environment Agency (EEA) as follows: to provide the
Member States and the Community with information;
to collect, record and assess data on the state of the
environment; to encourage harmonisation of the
methods of measurement; to promote the incorporation
of European environmental information into
international monitoring programmes; to ensure data
dissemination; to cooperate with other Community
bodies and international institutions.
Even the Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal
Products (EMEA), which comes closest to being a
fully-fledged regulatory body, does not take decisions
concerning the safety and efficacy of new medical
drugs, but submits opinions concerning the approval
of such drugs to the European Commission. Provision,
coordination and dissemination of information are
also central to the work of EMEA.
There are several reasons why the new European
agencies have not been granted broader powers. First,
the fully-fledged agency model raises delicate issues
for European law since nothing in the founding Treaties
provides for the creation of such bodies. Article 4 of
the Rome Treaty lists the various institutions operating
at Community level and specifies that each of them
must act ‘within the limits of the powers conferred
upon them by this Treaty’. This has generally been
read as a prohibition on the establishment of additional
bodies, short of a Treaty revision. As early as 1958, the
European Court of Justice indicated that the delegation
of powers by Community institutions to ad hoc bodies
not envisaged by the Treaty on the European Coal and
Steel Community was only possible subject to strict
conditions; in any event, the delegation of broad
discretionary powers was not permitted. This ‘Meroni
Doctrine’ is generally held to be applicable in the
broader context of the Rome Treaty as well.
Another reason for not granting broader powers to
the new agencies is the emphasis that was laid down
from the very beginning on an essentially legislative
approach to integration. The Community adopts a
legislative act which is subsequently transposed by the
Member States into their own legal system and applied
by their own administration. With some important
exceptions in the areas of competition, anti-dumping,
and agricultural policies, the Community has never
departed from its traditional mode of decentralised
administration. Hence, the delegation to autonomous
bodies of rule-making and enforcement powers was
always resented by the Member States as too intrusive,
since it would alter the delicate balance of power
which has presided over the growth of Community
competences.
Moreover, the lack of a significant European
tradition of statutory regulation by independent
agencies certainly contributed to the reluctance of
national governments to grant European agencies
powers they were unwilling to delegate to domestic
institutions. This may be changing, however, as the
link between agency independence and policy
credibility is more clearly recognised. Also, Member
States may discover that agencies are an effective way
of dealing with new tasks without increasing the size
of the Commission. An analogous situation arose in
America during the New Deal. The independence of
the regulatory bodies created in that period – the
Federal Communications Commission, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and the Civil Aeronautics
Board, to name only a few – was the price President
F.D. Roosevelt had to pay for acceptance by the US
Congress and the Supreme Court of a significant
expansion of federal competences. The President would
have preferred to assign the new functions to executive
departments under his immediate control, but the
other branches of government were not willing to
accept this.
For the time being at any rate, the new European
agencies have weak regulatory powers, but this
constraint could actually become an opportunity: with
knowledge and persuasion as the principal means of
influence at their disposal, the agencies could develop
indirect, information-based modes of regulation more
in tune with current economic, technological and
political conditions than the coercive instruments of
command and control that have been denied to them.
Information can affect expectations and behaviour
only if it is credible, and credibility requires autonomy.
This is why European statisticians have been demanding
more independence, not only for the national statistical
offices, but also for the statistical office of the EU,
Eurostat. Thus, the Director-General of the National
Statistical Institute of Italy, a vigorous advocate of the
political independence of his own institution, has
argued that the independence of Eurostat from political
pressures, as well as from the immediate needs of
policy-making, should be visible and operational vis-
à-vis all relevant players, including the Commission.
No single player, he writes, should have a monopoly12
on statistical authority; impartiality should be
operationalised in the relationship with all the different
players, national and supranational.
Such concerns are both widespread and justified.
Although the importance of independence for policy
credibility is acknowledged in principle, habits of
political and bureaucratic interference have deep
historical roots in Europe, and often continue to persist
in practice, To protect their autonomy, agencies must
rely on a variety of defence mechanisms.
Professionalism provides some protection.
Professionals are oriented by goals, standards of
conduct and career opportunities derived from their
professional community, giving them strong reasons
for resisting interference and direction from political
outsiders. Networking and reputation are other
important defence mechanisms.
The network as bearer of reputation
Networking and close cooperation with national and
international institutions are fundamental to the work
of the new European agencies. The EEA, for example,
is expected to work closely with national agencies and
research institutions, with Eurostat and the Joint
Research Centre, and with international agencies such
as the World Health Organisation, UNEP, and the UN
Economic Commission for Europe.
Similarly, the EMEA works closely with national
regulatory authorities and, in particular, coordinates
national activities with respect to post-marketing
surveillance of medicinal products circulating in the
EU (pharmacovigilance), inspection, and laboratory
controls. The EMEA is also a key actor in the
International Conference on Harmonisation of
Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (the so-called ICH
process), which brings together regulators and industry
representatives from the US, the EU, Japan, and an
increasing number of developed and developing
countries.
In fact, the agencies have been designed in a way
that makes cooperation and networking unavoidable.
Both their governing boards and their scientific advisory
boards are composed of representatives of the Member
States, the Commission, and (in the case of the EEA,
the EMEA, and the Monitoring Centre for Drug and
Drug Addiction) of the European Parliament as well.
At any rate, small size and limited financial and
human resources make the new agencies heavily
dependent on existing expertise and policy
infrastructure. It is also very likely that one of the
consequences of the greater emphasis on subsidiarity
will be a considerable expansion of bilateral and
multilateral cooperation and coordination among
national regulatory bodies, leading to the emergence
of more or less formalised network structures.
In recent years, management theorists have devoted
a good deal of attention to the role of networks in
industrial organisations, pointing out their usefulness
in terms of information exchange, division of labour,
and informal coordination. Motivational factors have
received less attention, but they are crucially important
for regulatory networks. It is well known that teamwork
can help individuals make credible commitments.
Although individuals may be weak on their own, they
can build resolve by forming a group. Any member of
the group is open to peer pressure and thus places
himself/herself in a situation where pride and self-
respect are lost when commitments are broken. The
success of organisations like Alcoholics Anonymous
and Weight Watchers is built on this insight.
Now, what is true of individuals in a team is also
true of agencies in a network. An agency that sees
itself as part of a transnational network of institutions
pursuing similar objectives and facing analogous
problems, rather than as a marginal addition to an
established bureaucracy pursuing a number of different
objectives, is more motivated to defend its policy
commitments and professional standards against
external influences. This is because the agency
executives have an incentive to maintain their
reputation in the eyes of the other members of the
network. Unprofessional or politically motivated
decisions would compromise the executives’
international reputation and make cooperation more
difficult to achieve in the future.
But how is reputation established in the first place?
By definition, a network is not hierarchically structured
and so lacks formal mechanisms for monitoring the
behaviour of its members and enforcing control. In
time, however, the network develops informal standards
and working practices that create shared expectations.
Knowledge about agencies that do not fulfil the
expectations of their partners spreads through the
network by informal means. In this way, the network
performs the crucial task of deciding which members
are in good standing and communicating that
information to other members. Only agencies with a
reputation for independence, expertise and
trustworthiness will be sought as partners. In short, the
network becomes an intangible asset bearing a
collective reputation and conferring that reputation
upon the agencies in good standing. Independence,
trust, reputation will be crucial to the viability of
European regulatory networks, and thus to the practical
implementation of the principle of subsidiarity in the
areas of economic and social regulation.
Problems of institutional design
There are different types of regulatory institutions.
Such institutions can be single-headed (agencies in the
narrow sense) or multi-headed (commissions, boards
or tribunals), more or less independent of the political
process, with broad or narrow competences, strong or
weak enforcement powers, and so on. In establishing
a new regulatory body, legislators and political
executives select, often implicitly rather than explicitly,
particular values for these and other decision variables.
Their choices determine the governance structure of
the agency.13
Institutional-design problems may be analysed with
the help of principal-agent theory. Political principals
delegate power to an administrative agent in order to
achieve certain benefits, but delegation also entails
costs, known as ‘agency costs’. The design problem is
to find the particular governance structure which
maximises the net benefits to the principal(s), subject
to various constraints. As the preceding discussion
suggests, among the benefits of delegation are a
reduction in the principal’s decision-making costs
(since he does not have to spend time on the technical
details of regulation), greater expertise, and greater
policy credibility.
In general, the broader the delegation (i.e., the more
independence given to the agency), the greater the
reduction in decision-making costs and the increase in
expertise and policy credibility. But delegation also
expands administrative discretion and, therefore, the
ability of regulators to act in their own interest. Such
agency costs may be reduced by strict procedural
requirements, transparency and public participation in
agency decision-making, and reliance on judicial
review. However, if it is not possible, for political or
institutional reasons, to reduce agency costs
sufficiently, or if the benefits of delegation are not
great enough to justify the costs, then principal-agent
theory suggests that policy should be developed and
implemented by a central department of government
rather than by an independent agency. This explains
why the agency model is used primarily in the area of
economic and social regulation, where the demand for
expertise and policy commitment is high and where
policy objectives can be defined fairly precisely, but
not in less well-defined and more ‘politicised’ areas of
policy-making.
Coordination costs must also be treated as agency
costs whenever previously centralised responsibilities
are allocated to various independent agents. Of course,
coordination is a serious problem in all complex
organisations, but it is especially acute in the case of
regulatory agencies. This is because budgetary
constraints have a limited impact on rule-making,
while the size and priorities of non-regulatory, direct-
expenditure programmes are determined by political
executives through the budgetary process. By contrast,
the real cost of regulations is borne not by the regulators
but by the firms, individuals and government
organisations which have to comply with the
regulations. The consequence is a serious lack of
coordination both within and across regulatory
programmes and agencies.
Regulatory issues tend to be dealt with sector by
sector, and even within the same sector it is often
difficult to see that regulatory priorities are set in a way
that explicitly takes into consideration either the
urgency of the problem or the benefits and costs of
different proposals. For example, the imbalance
between water and air pollution existing in EC
environmental policy can hardly be explained by
differences in the seriousness of the relevant problems.
The health and environmental effects of inadequate
regulation of air pollution, as well as the impact of
divergent national regulations on competition, are no
less serious than in the case of water pollution.
A cost that is never mentioned in the context of the
principal-agent model is the potential loss of
legitimation as a consequence of delegation. Political
principals can transfer power to their agents, within
limits set by law, but they cannot transfer legitimacy
in the same way. The new institutions must be able to
achieve their own legitimacy. This is, of course, no
easy task. The technocrats who head independent
agencies are appointed, not elected, officials, yet they
wield considerable power. How is the exercise of that
power to be democratically controlled?
Actually, this question arises not only for agencies but
for all ‘non-majoritarian institutions’, i.e. institutions
that, by design, are not directly accountable to the
voters or to their elected representatives. Besides
independent agencies, examples of non-majoritarian
institutions include independent central banks,
supranational institutions like the European
Commission, and courts of law. Each of these
institutions faces a legitimacy problem. The
Commission, for instance, is often accused of suffering
from a ‘democratic deficit’, and even a constitutional
court must face the issue whenever it strikes down a
policy choice made by an electorally accountable
branch of government and supplants it with a policy
choice of its own.
As in the case of other agency costs, it is possible to
devise methods to reduce coordination problems and
improve legitimacy. Thus, if lack of budgetary
discipline is a serious defect of the regulatory process,
one can attempt to create coordination and control
mechanisms similar to those traditionally used for
direct public expenditures. Following this line of
reasoning, analysts of the American regulatory process
have introduced the idea of a ‘regulatory budget’. In its
basic outline, the regulatory budget would be
established by Congress and the President for each
agency, starting with a budget constraint on total
private expenditures mandated by regulation, and then
allocating the budget among the different agencies.
The knowledge that agencies would be competing
against each other would lead them to propose their
most cost-effective regulation in order to win
presidential and congressional approval. Simultaneous
consideration of all new regulations would permit an
assessment of their joint impact on particular industries
and on the economy as a whole. Finally, the placement
of the regulatory budget decisions in the hands of
Congress and the President would force them to assume
responsibility for the overall magnitude and priorities
of regulation and for inter-agency coordination. With
suitable modifications, this approach could also be
used in Europe, and would be particularly useful at EC
level.
Concerning the legitimation problem, the challenge
is to develop methods of democratic accountability14
peuvent survivre qu’avec l’aide des instances
régulatrices.
Deuxièmement, dans le système d’élaboration de
politiques créé par le Traité de Rome, la mise en
oeuvre de la plupart des règles communautaires relève
de la responsabilité des Etats membres, qui souvent
doivent instituer de nouveaux organismes ou du moins
élargir à cette fin les organismes déjà en place. On le
voit, le développement de la CE en tant qu’ “Etat
régulateur” a fortement influencé un développement
parallèle au niveau national.
Une confiance toujours plus grande dans la
régulation a donné naissance à une nouvelle génération
d’organismes régulateurs qui opèrent tout près du
gouvernement central. Cela s’explique par le fait que
les besoins fonctionnels de régulation sont le mieux
satisfaits par des organisations alliant flexibilité et
expertise, et capables de s’engager sur des objectifs
régulateurs à long terme. Les engagements à long
terme en matière de politiques sont toujours
problématiques pour tout gouvernement démocratique,
étant donné que celui-ci est tout naturellement plus
sensible aux préoccupations électorales. On voit dans
cette délégation de pouvoirs régulateurs à des agences
indépendantes un moyen permettant aux gouverne-
ments de s’engager sur des objectifs à long terme qui
ne seraient pas crédibles en l’absence de tels pouvoirs.
Pour leur part, les agences peuvent protéger leur
indépendance et accroître leur propre crédibilité en
établissant des réseaux avec des organismes
régulateurs de nature similaire dans l’UE. Une agence
qui se voit comme faisant partie d’un réseau
transnational d’institutions poursuivant des objectifs
similaires est davantage motivée pour défendre ses
engagements de politique et ses normes profession-
nelles contre les influences extérieures. Des décisions
non professionnelles ou motivées politiquement
compromettraient la réputation internationale de
l’agence et rendraient plus difficile une coopération à
l’avenir.
Le modèle d’agence comprend un certain nombre
de structures différentes de gouvernance. La nature
d’une structure donnée est déterminée par des variables
telles que le niveau de délégation de pouvoirs, le degré
d’autonomie de l’agence, les méthodes de nomination
du personnel cadre, les procédures décisionnelles, les
pouvoirs d’exécution, et ainsi de suite. Le problème de
la conception institutionnelle consiste à sélectionner
la structure de gouvernance qui répond le mieux aux
besoins particuliers des décideurs.
___________________________
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that do not negate the principle of agency autonomy.
A literal interpretation of the requirement of direct
accountability to the voters or to their elected
representatives would suggest that political
independence and democratic accountability are
mutually exclusive. It is a mistake, however, to apply
standards of legitimacy derived from a particular
model of democracy – the ‘Westminster’ model,
whereby Parliament is the absolute sovereign and, as
such, the only source of legitimacy – to other political
systems (and this includes the vast majority of Western
democracies) where non-majoritarian institutions play
a significant role. In such systems any mechanism for
limiting, diffusing and controlling power (e.g., checks
and balances, enumerated competences, judicial
review) is a potential source of legitimacy.
Starting from this broader view of legitimacy, it is
possible to keep independent agencies democratically
accountable by a combination of control mechanisms:
clear and narrowly defined objectives, to facilitate
accountability by results; strict procedural require-
ments, to limit regulatory discretion; judicial review,
to ensure protection of the rights of citizens;
professionalism and peer review, to certify the technical
quality of agency decisions; transparency and public
participation, to make agencies responsive to public
concerns. It can be shown that the evolution of
regulatory agencies and decision-making in America
has in fact been guided by these or similar principles,
The experience of American regulatory bodies shows
that when such a multi-pronged system of controls
works properly, no one controls an independent agency,
yet the agency is ‘under control’.
RÉSUMÉ
Le modèle d’agence: la croissance de la régulation et
des institutions régulatrices dans l’Union européenne
Les agences régulatrices sont l’expression institution-
nelle d’un nouveau mode de conduite des affaires de
l’Etat qui, plutôt que de s’appuyer sur le pouvoir
traditionnel en matière de prélèvement des impôts et
de dépenses, repose sur des règles destinées à faciliter
l’intégration du marché et à corriger les échecs du
marché. L’importance grandissante de la régulation
dans la Communauté européenne/l’Union européenne
(CE/UE) est due à deux grands facteurs: d’une part,
les politiques de privatisation; d’autre part, l’impact
des règles communautaires sur le processus
d’élaboration des politiques au niveau national.
Tout d’abord, la privatisation des services publics
s’accompagne généralement de la régulation des prix
et conditions de service, alors que les entreprises
nouvellement privatisées perdent leur immunité par
rapport aux règles nationales et européennes en matière
de concurrence. Dans les industries telles que les
secteurs des télécommunications et de l’énergie, le
pouvoir des nouvelles entreprises privatisées est
tellement grand que les nouveaux concurrents ne